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I. INTRODUCTION
A doctor injects the cytoplasm from one woman’s egg into the egg of another woman, and a baby is born
who expresses the genes of three diﬀerent people.2 A biotechnology company in Massachusetts reports that
they have created a cloned human embryo.3 It is now possible for a baby to have (at least) ﬁve “parents”:
the mother and father who raise her, the egg and sperm donors who contribute her genetic material, and
the surrogate who carries her to term.
In the last several years, there have been a number of advances in the area of assisted (or advanced)
reproductive technology (ART) that are so fantastic that they strain the credulity of even those well-versed
in medicine and science. Moreover, the potential medical, legal, psychological, and social repercussions of
the applications of these technologies cause most people who hear about their use to worry somewhat about
the ramiﬁcations. In fact, part of the general fear of these technologies amongst the public is generated by
the sense that they are not competent to make decisions, either for their own use of ART or about their
opinions on its use by others.
This fear is well-founded. The science used is complicated, and the concerns that result from its use are too
far-ﬂung and complex for any one person to be able to anticipate and then address in one cogent, overarching
1J.D., Harvard Law School, projected 2002; B.A., University of Iowa, 1999.
2Jason Barritt et al, ‘‘Mitochondria in Human Offspring Derived from Ooplasmic Transplantation,’’ Human
Reproduction 16, no. 3 (2001): 513-16, at 513.
3Rachel Benson Gold and Elizabeth Nash, ‘‘State Policy in 2001: Major Reproductive Health-Related
Developments’’, The Guttmacher Report on Public Policy, vol.4, no.6, p.11, at 14 (Dec. 2001).
1policy statement.4 These complexities lead to the conclusion that the federal government should become
more involved in the regulation of the use of ART. More speciﬁcally, the United States Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) should take an active role in regulating ART on a federal level.
In Part II.A of the paper, the law and regulation of ART in the United States is detailed. The problems of
this vast, piecemeal scheme are highlighted. In Part II.B, the various steps that other nations around the
globe have taken with regard to the regulation of ARTs are detailed. This is not only to bring the failings
of the United States’s model into relief, but also for the purpose of suggesting options that the American
regulatory scheme could adopt as its own.
Part III of the paper discusses the policy reasons in favor of giving federal regulatory power over ARTs to
the FDA. Both practical and theoretical reasons are discussed, with an emphasis on the history of the role
of the FDA in regulating the safety and eﬃcacy of pharmaceuticals and medical devices.
In Part IV, a comprehensive scheme for the federal regulation of ARTs is detailed. This plan would include
the formation of a National Commission to conduct broad-based research into the current legal, medical,
psychological, and social issues raised by the application of ART and to propose various measures to address
them. Under this plan, the FDA would be given the authority to regulate the use of ARTs for safety and
eﬃcacy, in line with its current mission to do the same for pharmaceuticals and medical devices. The goal
of this plan would be to create a comprehensive national regulatory scheme that would not only protect
ART patients, the children born as a result of ART technology, and society at large, but also one that
eliminates the confusion in the law and policy in this area so that practitioners and patients are able to make
responsible, informed decisions about their use of ARTs.
II. CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEMES
4In fact, the potential concerns raised by the application of ARTs are so vast that they cannot be
addressed in this paper. Accordingly, the detailed discussion will focus on the regulation of the actual
ART procedures, and will touch only briefly on the myriad issues the procedures create within law and society.
2A. The American Status Quo
1. Federal
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court reiﬁed the “recognized protection accorded to liberty
relating to intimate relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child.”5
And currently, the United States has no regulatory body charged with the assessment of genetic and re-
productive technologies.6 This sweeping constitutional protection of reproductive freedom and the lack of
regulation of ART has created a laissez-faire climate in which many diﬀerent kinds of ART services of varying
quality and eﬀectiveness are oﬀered by a wide range of providers.7
Clearly, the Casey decision states that Americans have the right to make their own decisions about their
reproductive lives, including the decision to utilize ART methods. But this does not automatically rule out
the possibility that the government might have a role in regulating the safety and eﬃcacy of the use of
various ART methods. In fact, the Supreme Court recognized in Roe v. Wade that the state has an interest
in regulating all medical procedures to “insure the maximum safety for the patient”, including procedures
that involve individual reproductive choice (in that case, abortion).8 This holding would logically extend to
ART methods, which almost always involve intervention with a medical procedure.
Under the Constitution, states are given the power to frame their own health care policy, not the U.S.
Congress. As a result, most national legislation in this area is a reaction to state legislation and typically
serves two functions: it establishes minimum national standards, or provides federal funding to encourage
5505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992).
6Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, Journal of Legal Medicine 36, 44
(March 2000).
7Id. at 45.
8410 U.S. 113, 150 (1972).
3state action.9 However, in certain instances, Congress has taken action to legislate national policy with
regard to emergency issues raised by ARTs.
a. Minimum National Standards
In 1992, the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certiﬁcation Act was passed by Congress. This was in
response to concerns that fertility clinics were misrepresenting their success rates to their potential clients
by manipulating the statistics.10 Under the Act, ART programs must report their rates of success to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, who then publishes a consumer guide annually with the information
(the ﬁrst guide was published in 1997).11 The Act also requires that ART programs identify the laboratories
they rely upon to handle and manipulate gametes and embryos. This information is also published in the
guide.12 The Secretary of Health and Human Services was also charged with the task of developing a model
inspection and certiﬁcation program for laboratories that handle embryos and gametes. This program would
be implemented by individual states.13
The FDA has proposed a new system for regulating products based on human cells and tissue. This new sys-
tem would deﬁne the aﬀected products as being those intended for “implantation, transplantation, infusion,
or transfer into a human recipient.” This would, thus, cover the transfer of gametes in ART procedures.
The new regulations would require all of these products to be manufactured in compliance with good tissue
practice standards. Enforcement and inspection would be a part of the new scheme, and there would be
labeling and reporting requirements.14 However, it is unknown what kind of impact these new regulations
9Robert H. Blank, Regulating Reproduction 114 (1991).
10Andrews & Estler, supra note 6, at 50.
11Id. at 50-51.
12Id. at 51.
13Id.
14Health Canada Online, Assisted human reproduction: The international scene, at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/media/releases/2001/2001 44ebk4.htm
(last visited Mar. 5, 2002).
4would have on the current ART regulatory scheme.
b. Federal Funding Limitations
Federal funding limitations have primarily focused on embryo and fetal research and human cloning research.
A number of prohibitions focus on these issues.
Federal funding for fetal research is permitted under the 1974 National Research Act and regulations pro-
mulgated under that law. That law disallows researchers from having any involvement in the decision to
abort and the assessment of fetal viability. The law also forbids tailoring the time and method of abortion
for the sake of research purposes and payments to women to induce them to have an abortion.15
Funding for fetal tissue transplantation research is allowed under a 1993 law. This law requires informed
consent, forbids provision of tissue in exchange for payment, and forbids the woman aborting to know the
person receiving the tissue, among other restrictions.16
Funding for IVF research is prohibited by a 1995 law that blocks funding for any research in which human
embryos are destroyed, discarded, or exposed to serious risk. However, stem cell research is allowed in some
cases under a 1993 law.17 President Bush approved limited federal funding for embryonic stem cell research
on August 9, 2001. Federal funds may be used in research on existing stem cell lines only. These existing
lines are from embryos created in private fertility clinics that are never going to be used in a treatment cycle
and so would be discarded anyway.18 Funding for stem cells created by cloning, or for the derivation of stem
cells from embryos themselves, is prohibited.19
15Heather Boonstra, ‘‘Human Embryo and Fetal Research: Medical Support and Political Controversy’’, The
Guttmacher Report on Public Policy, vol.4, no.1, p.4 (Feb. 2001).
16Id.
17Id.
18‘‘For the Record: Bush Okays Some Stem Cell Research Funding; Debate Continues’’, The Guttmacher Report on
Public Policy, vol.4, no.4, p.12 (Aug. 2001).
19Boonstra, supra note 15.
5Federal funding is not permitted for human cloning research.20
c. Federal Legislation
In April 2002, President Bush urged the Senate to pass a law banning human cloning for all research and
reproductive purposes. This law would make it a federal crime to create a cloned human embryo. The House
of Representatives passed this bill in August 2001. The Senate, however, is divided on whether or not there
should be exceptions permitted for research purposes.21
2. Physician and Scientist Self-Regulation
Standards of practice for physicians are developed from studies and commentary that develop within the
medical community. On some occasions, notably in new ﬁelds such as ART, professional organizations eval-
uate this data and recommend standards of clinical practice.22 There are, however, few if any penalties for
non-compliance with these self-imposed guidelines.23 Furthermore, there is no requirement that a physician
belong to any peer-monitoring organization.24 Participation is voluntary, and thus any standards promul-
gated by those organizations are complied with only if a doctor chooses to do so.25 There are also multiple
peer organizations in the ﬁeld of ART, all of which are free to promulgate conﬂicting recommendations to
their membership.26
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) has issued a number of statements of
20Id.
21Major Garrett, ‘‘Bush prods Senate to adopt ban on all cloning’’, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/04/10/bush.cloning/
(April 11, 2002).
22Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The ‘‘Orwellian Nightmare’’ Reconsidered: A Proposed Regulatory Framework for the
Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 Ga. L. Rev. 625, 667-68 (1991).
23Id. at 668.
24Id. at 669.
25Id.
26Id.
6position on the use of ARTs.27 ACOG has broadly approved the use of IVF technology for married couples
using their own genetic material and not freezing embryos produced by the procedure. The organization
recommends that doctors discuss with their patients how many embryos should be implanted and what to
do with those that are not used in an IVF treatment cycle. ACOG also recommends adherence to some
minimal technical standards, as set by ACOG and the American Fertility Society. ACOG approves research
on embryos outside a woman’s body up until the fourteenth day after fertilization, if the research is subject
to prior approval by an internal review board (IRB) and is in compliance with “ethical standards”.28
The American Fertility Society (AFS) has a broader membership than that of ACOG. It includes medical
practitioners, researchers, and other people interested in the ﬁeld of fertility, whereas ACOG’s membership
is limited to obstetricians and gynecologists.29 AFS has published minimum standards for the use of IVF
and related ARTs by doctors. Their standards include minimum training and qualiﬁcation for program
personnel. AFS has promulgated similar guidelines for gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), including the
recommendation that GIFT facilities also provide IVF services.30 AFS has also issued guidelines for artiﬁ-
cial insemination procedures, which include donor semen used in ART procedures. These guidelines largely
concern the testing of the sperm for HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs).31
AFS also distinguishes between experimental and established procedures in their minimum standards guide-
lines. As of 1991, IVF, GIFT, the use of donor eggs, the use of donor pre-embryos, and embryo cryopreser-
vation were established procedures. Experimental procedures included egg freezing, ovum transfer, embryo
ﬂushing, and egg or embryo micromanipulation techniques. To be in compliance with AFS guidelines, ex-
perimental procedures must be done under the guidance of an IRB.32 As time passes and experimental
27Id.
28Eggen, supra note 22, at 669-70.
29Id. at 671, 669.
30Id. at 671.
31Id. at 672.
32Id. at 671-72.
7treatments accrue a track record of success, the Board of Directors of AFS moves procedures listed as ex-
perimental to the list of established procedures.33
AFS recommends that all ART programs submit all their success rate statistics to the United States In Vitro
Fertilization Registry, or, in the alternative, make those statistics available to their patients. AFS suggests
a full disclosure to prospective patients, including the ART clinic’s history of experience with a particular
treatment and their record of success.34
The American Association of Tissue Banks has established guidelines for obtaining and storing donor sperm.
Among their recommendations is the suggestion that donor sperm be screened for medical conditions that
would make the donor an unlikely candidate for use in artiﬁcial insemination and ART programs.35
The AFS established the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART). This group was intended to
provide quality control that peer-monitoring organizations usually do not. SART members must have proven
success rates that meet minimum standards of the organization.36 Because SART membership is voluntary,
however, this does nothing to stop clinics which cannot meet the minimum standards from continuing to
oﬀer ART services. Only consumer awareness of the SART “seal of quality assurance” gives the minimum
standards any eﬀect.
Additionally, where a medical specialty involves quick innovation, as does ART, the self-regulatory system
cannot address rapidly enough the new issues that arise from its applications.37 These concerns create a
situation in which government regulation becomes necessary to address the problem.
33Id. at 672.
34Eggen, supra note 22, at 671. See supra Part II.A.1 for a discussion of the federal reporting laws. See
infra Part II.A.3.b.iv for a discussion of state reporting laws.
35Id. at 673.
36Id.
37Id. at 668.
83. State
a. State Licensing
State licensing is the primary means of regulating the conduct of all physicians, including those who perform
ART procedures.38 The statutes which set forth these licensing provisions give the medical profession self-
regulation. The profession itself determines who will be permitted to become a physician and assures quality
in medical practice within that state.39 The licensing boards are not, however, charged with developing the
standards of care and practice for the medical profession.40 This responsibility currently rests with peer
organizations.41
b. State Legislation
Under the U.S. Constitution, the state legislatures, rather than Congress, are responsible for health policy.42
States do have the power to mandate standards of their own for ART providers, as they do for any health
care facility under their licensing power.43
i. Laws Respecting IVF
38Id. at 667.
39Id.
40Eggen, supra note 22, at 667-68.
41See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of peer monitoring by professional organizations.
42Robert H. Blank, Regulating Reproduction 114 (1990).
43Eggen, supra note 22, at 674.
9A few states have statutes that directly regulate IVF, but often in very diﬀerent ways. Pennsylvania re-
quires that all IVF practitioners report their data to the state Department of Health, including statistics on
discarded and destroyed embryos. There are some minimal ﬁnes for willful failure to report correct informa-
tion.44 New Hampshire law directly regulates the doctor-patient relationship in the IVF treatment process.
The statutes require that patients receive medical evaluations and counseling about the procedure. Embryos
may not remain outside the body for more than fourteen days after fertilization.45 Louisiana law requires
that IVF clinics conform to ACOG and AFS standards and that their programs be headed by a physician
with the training recommended by those peer groups.46 Louisiana also broadly regulates extracorporeal
embryos created in IVF procedures. They are considered “juridical persons” under this law, and may only
be used for implantation in a human woman. They may not be sold or used in procedures where the end
is purely research-oriented. The statute also gives the embryo certain rights, deﬁnes the ownership of the
genetic material, and speciﬁes duties that IVF providers and patients have with regard to the embryo.47
Intentional destruction of any fertilized egg is prohibited.48
ii. Laws Respecting
Research on Fetuses and Embryos
State statutes that limit experimentation and research on aborted fetuses are fairly common. However, some
of these statutes are written in such a way that they do extend to IVF and other ART procedures.49 Still
other states have passed experimentation statutes that address non-aborted fetuses and embryos. In New
44Id. at 676.
45Id.
46Id. at 673-74.
47Id. at 676-77.
48Id. at 677.
49Eggen, supra note 22, at 674-76.
10Mexico, a statute limits research on pregnant women, fetuses, and embryos. The statute doesn’t prohibit
IVF programs, but limits them by requiring that all embryos produced in an IVF cycle be implanted in
the female patient or donated to another woman. Cryopreservation is presumably acceptable under this
law (because the purpose is to increase the likelihood that the embryo will eventually be implanted), but
prohibits embryo destruction or research that might destroy an embryo.50 The Illinois fetal experimentation
statute attempted to prohibit sale of or experimentation on embryos and fetuses, unless the experiments
were therapeutic to the embryo/fetus itself. This statute expressly included embryos produced during IVF
procedures.51 However, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found in Lifchez
v. Hartigan that this law violated the constitutionally guaranteed reproductive rights of individuals.52 This
case thus calls into question the validity of similar laws in other states.
iii. Laws Respecting Artiﬁcial Insemination
Most states have some statutory regulation of artiﬁcial insemination by donor (AID). These laws address
the situation in which a donor’s sperm is used in ARTs, rather than that of a husband (in which case the
procedure is called AIH).53 Typically, these laws legitimize the child born as a result of the insemination
by designating the inseminated woman’s husband as the legal parent, instead of the donor, so long as the
husband agreed to the AID procedure. However, some states have laws regulating screening of donors for
50Id. at 678-79.
51Id. at 679.
52Id. at 679-82. See infra Part II.A.3.c for the conﬂicting view of the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law.
53Id. at 682-83.
11both infectious and genetic diseases.54
iv. Laws Respect-
ing the Reporting of Success Statistics
A few states have laws respecting the disclosure of success statistics. In Virginia, individual ART clinics
must disclose their success rates to their patients. The information given to patients must contain the total
number of live births and the percentage of live births per retrieval cycle by age group.55
v. Laws Respecting Human Cloning
Six states–Virginia, California, Louisiana, Michigan, Rhode Island, and South Dakota–currently have laws
prohibiting the cloning of humans.56 The law in Virginia, passed in 2001, bans “the creation of or attempt
to create a human being” via cloning.57 This type of drafting leaves open the possibility of use of human
cloning techniques for the purpose of producing embryos that are destroyed when used for medical and
research purposes.
54Id.
55Andrews & Estler, supra note 6, at 51. See supra Part II.A.1 for a discussion of a similar federal law.
In some cases, the 1992 federal law may make moot the state laws regarding success rate reporting. However,
some states may require more than the federal law currently provides with regard to disclosure.
56Gold and Nash, supra note 3, at 11.
57Id. at 14.
12vi. Laws Respecting Surrogacy
After the Baby M. case, many state legislatures introduced bills to impact the legal status of surrogate
motherhood. By 1990, 73 bills had been introduced in 27 states and the District of Columbia respecting
the issue. They were split almost evenly into thirds: one-third proposed to ban surrogacy arrangements,
one-third proposed to regulate them, and one-third proposed state commissions to study the issue.58
In 1989, Nevada passed a law making surrogacy arrangements legal but subject to strict regulations. Included
were required home visits by the state welfare division to all parties involved, proof that the intended mother
was infertile, required counseling for the surrogate and the intended parents, and testing for psychological
disorders, sexually transmitted diseases, and genetic problems.59
Some states, including New Jersey and Louisiana, have made surrogacy contracts unenforceable. In Michigan,
a law was passed in 1988 making surrogacy arrangements illegal and punishable by jailing and ﬁnes.60
Still other states have made surrogacy arrangements legal and enforceable within their borders. Arkansas,
one extreme example, passed legislation endorsing surrogate motherhood.61
vii. Review of State Legislation
Problems remain, even with this kind of state legislation. First, these types of laws are not in eﬀect in many
58Blank, supra note 9, at 122.
59Id.
60Id.
61Id.
13states. Second, they address narrow issues in the broad ﬁeld of ART, most often IVF technology, while
leaving most ART-related problems unsolved. And even with the topics that are covered, the setting of
standards is sometimes left to a peer organization. And ﬁnally, it is currently unclear which kinds of state
legislation might run afoul of the constitutional protections of reproductive freedom.
c. State Commissions on Reproductive Policy: The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law
This task force, created in 1985 by an executive order of the governor, recommends policy on
many issues involving the impact of medical advances on life and death, one of many being ARTs.62
The recommendations of the committee include legislation, regulation, and public education
measures, as well as others.63
In the fall of 1995, the Task Force began to examine the field of ART in its entirety. The
deliberations of the Task Force took two years.64 Their research was broad in scope. Every
ART program in New York submitted copies of their advertisements, consent forms, and other
program materials. Practitioners in selected programs met with the Task Force to provide their
input on particular issues in greater detail. They also conducted telephone interviews with
people who had used ART methods in New York programs.65
The Task Force’s conclusions and recommendations were presented in 1998. With regard to the
constitutional protection of reproductive choice, the Task Force concluded that these protections
were intended to protect coital reproduction by married couples, and that the protections were
based on multiple factors. The Task Force concluded that noncoital reproduction by a married
62The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Analysis and
Recommendations for Public Policy ix(April 1998).
63Id.
64Id.
65Id. at ix-x. See supra Part II.A.3.b for the conﬂicting view of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
14couple using their own gametes implicated many of those same factors; however, the further
that ART moved away from that original model, the factors that originally dictated the protection
of reproductive freedom began to disappear. In the end, the Task Force concluded that many
courts might believe that the constitutional right to procreate might not apply to procreation
using ART methods.66
The Task Force made multiple practical recommendations for governing the ART field. These
recommendations were lengthy, and included issues of ethical and legal obligations in accepting
patients for treatment, in selecting treatments with the potential to result in multiple gestation
pregnancies, the introduction of new, untried ART methods, discrimination against patients
on the basis of various factors, HIV testing of patients, and psychological and behavioral
screening of patients. The recommendations of the Task Force, while calling for some legislation
on specific issues such as discrimination and the monitoring of ART outcome data by the state
Department of Health, largely relied on physicians and private, professional organizations
to self-regulate. While the Task Force did suggest conclusions they felt these actors must
necessarily reach as a result of their professional and ethical obligations, the group did
not recommend any legislation or regulation to ensure that they did so.67
In addition to their broad analysis of the ART field, the Task Force has also made more targeted
recommendations on specific problems within the field of ART. In 1987, the Task Force recommended
legislation that would make paid surrogacy illegal and render all surrogacy contracts void
and unenforceable at law.68 Legislation based on these recommendations was enacted in New
York in 1992.69 As a part of a Task Force study on organ and tissue donation, semen donor
66Id. at xii-xiii.
67Id. at xiii-xxxii.
68The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, Surrogate Parenting: Analysis and Recommendations for
Public Policy (1989).
69New York State Task Force, supra note 62.
15screening came under their scrutiny. The Task Force recommended that the Department of Health
be authorized to regulate the collection and distribution of organs and tissues, including
donor semen.70 In 1990, legislation was enacted pursuant to these recommendations, and since
then, the Department of Health in New York has written extensive regulations that directly
target all aspects of semen and egg donation.71
B. The International Response
1. Commissions and Reports
Many countries already have regulation of ART. Many of these nations convened special commissions to
consider the problems associated with ART and other new reproductive issues. The following are three
countries selected for discussion because their programs are of particular note when considering the possibility
of federal regulation of ARTs in the United States.
a. The United Kingdom
The ﬁrst IVF baby was born in the U.K. in 1978, and that country was the world leader with regard
to government policymaking on ARTs. In 1982, the Warnock Committee was created by Parliament to
investigate and make recommendations about ARTs. This was the ﬁrst government-sponsored report on
ARTs. In 1984, the Committee issued 64 recommendations concerning the ethical and legal issues ARTs pose
70Id.
71Id.
16for society. Notably, these issues were characterized as “emergency” concerns for the British government.72
The Warnock report believed that, despite its sympathy for the plight of infertile couples, regulation was
needed to oversee the use of ARTs. The Committee recommended a licensing committee be created and that
the ARTs of the time, namely AID, IVF, egg donation, embryo donation, and the use of frozen embryos be
done only by licensed parties. The report was generally favorable to the use of ARTs, but called for a ban
on surrogacy as contrary to the public good.73
Today in the U.K., a government agency, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), began
supervising and licensing human embryo research in 1991 after the passage of the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act (HFEA Act).74 It was the ﬁrst agency of this type in the entire world. The HFEA Act
gives HFEA the power to license and monitor clinics that conduct ART procedures of various types. HFEA
is also charged with developing a code of practice to guide ART clinics in their operations. The code covers
not only the ART procedures themselves, but also the maintenance of a register of gamete donors, records of
all treatment cycles, and the outcomes of those cycles. Rules about information and advice given to patients,
donors, and clinics are included in the code as well. Also, HFEA reviews information and activities that are
covered under the HFEA Act, and provides advice to the Secretary of State on related matters.
Every ART clinic in the United Kingdom must be licensed by HFEA. These clinics are inspected annually
by accredited inspectors. HFEA monitors for concerns with regard to the welfare of the child, clinic staﬀ
and facilities, donor assessment, information and counseling oﬀered, legal consent, and storage/handling/use
of the gametes and embryos.
The HFEA Act was amended in 2000 to allow researchers to use early-stage clconed embryos to create
stem cells for research. The Act had previously allowed for embryo research and the creation of embryos
for research purposes. However, a part of the legislation required that no cloning for human reproductive
72Blank, supra note 9, at 143.
73Id. at 143-45.
74Andrews & Estler, supra note 6, at 44.
17purposes would ever be allowed.75
b. Canada
In 1989, the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies was created by the government of
Canada.76 The Royal Commission’s broad mandate allows it the authority to recommend policies that
cover any topic in subject area of genetic and reproductive technology.77 The Commission has been particu-
larly concerned not only with the views of experts in the ﬁelds of medicine, law, and ethics when making its
policy decisions, but also the opinions of Canadians at large. In order to ascertain what values and mores
Canadians hold that would impact upon the issue, the Commission compiled research from over 70 diﬀerent
ﬁelds, including the measurable psychological and social impact of infertility, the use of ART, and genetic
research.78 The Commission has used more informal, grassroots methods of gathering information as well.
They maintain a toll-free telephone number that citizens may call up to report their opinions and experiences
in this area.79 Canadians, the Commission determined, are particularly concerned with the commodiﬁcation
and objectiﬁcation of reproduction and genetic material.80 They are also anxious that the vulnerable, such
as the children who are produced through ART methods and the infertile people who seek these treatments,
be protected from the possible negative consequences of potential policy in this area.81
The Canadian Commission has thus recommended bans on cloning, paid surrogate motherhood, genetic
75Health Canada Online, supra note 14.
76Proceed With Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies 2-3 (1993).
77Andrews & Estler, supra note 6, at 44.
78Id.
79Id. at 44-45.
80Id. at 45.
81Id.
18enhancement, and sex selection for nonmedical purposes.82
c. Australia
The Australian constitution grants responsibility for legislation over most health-care issues to the several
states, which renders the situation in that country remarkably similar to that of the United States.
The medical practice is overseen on the national level by the National Health and Medical Research Council.
All medical personnel must work in compliance with the Council’s guidelines, and the Council reports to
the Federal Health Minister. The Council of the Fertility Society of Australia (FSA) is a multi-disciplinary
society formed soon after IVF technology arrived in Australia in 1984. They promulgate guidelines and
regulations to govern practitioners in their practice of ARTs.
In 1987, the FSA established the Reproductive Technology Accreditation Committee (RTAC). The member-
ship includes a chairman nominated by the FSA, a reproductive specialist, a scientist, a counselor, a nurse,
and a patient representative that are nominated from their respective peer groups. RTAC oversees all IVF
in Australia, and they visit and accredit every IVF center on a three year schedule. The Committee has a
very strict and detailed set of patient care guidelines. RTAC is funded by IVF clinics through a voluntary
process.
The Australian experience with IVF began in the state of Victoria, where the Infertility Treatment Act
of 1984 (revised 1995) is in eﬀect. It established the Infertility Treatment Authority (ITA), which has a
82Id.
19number of responsibilities. The ITA licenses ART clinics that do treatment and/or research and approves
practitioners in the ﬁeld (including doctors, counselors, and scientists). It also enforces the time limit for the
storage of sperm, eggs, and embryos in cryopreservation, and maintains three registers on donor-treatment
procedures. The ITA monitors decision-making and consent processes and reports information about ART
to the legislature and others. The ITA will not issue a license to an IVF clinic unless it is accredited by
the RTAC, in order to guarantee that clinics are in compliance with RTAC protocol and the Act’s legal
provisions.83
III. DRUGS84 AND DEVICES VERSUS PROCEDURES: THE LOGICAL NEXT STEP
FOR THE FDA
The mission of the FDA includes the charge to ensure that drugs and therapeutic devices for use on humans
are safe and eﬀective.85 The FDA reviews drugs and medical devices prior to marketing in order to ensure
both safety and eﬃcacy, and also monitors after marketing of the drug or device begins to check that the
safety and eﬃcacy records remain acceptable. The Administration also inspects manufacturer facilities and
tests samples of the products to test for compliance.86
This Paper posits that the policy reasons for regulating to ensure the safety and eﬃcacy of drugs and devices
apply with equal force to the argument that the FDA should also regulate medical procedures in the same
manner. The reasons the FDA’s mission has not included the regulation of medical procedures is a purely
historic artifact, a result of the manner in which the FDA came into being. Tradition rather than logic
83Health Canada Online, supra note 14.
84In this Part and throughout the Paper, ‘‘drugs’’ refers to prescription drugs. While some of the
statements made about the regulation of drugs in this Paper also apply to over-the-counter drugs, some do
not.
85Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials--2nd ed. 21 (1991).
86Id.
20has been responsible for the distinction between the regulation of drugs and devices and the regulation of
procedures.
A. The History of Drug Regulation and the FDA
The reason that the FDA regulates drugs and devices but not medical procedures is not one of logical
distinction, but a product of the legislation which led to the creation of the FDA. The Administration grew
out of federal legislation that was largely reactionary. The ﬁrst regulation of pharmaceuticals on a national
level that began in 1813 with legislation that was intended to prevent the marketing of fraudulent smallpox
vaccinations.87 Over time, the concern about the safety and eﬃcacy of all drugs grew. People worried that
the drugs they were taking were either adulterated with dangerous ingredients88, were being fraudulently
marketed when they were in truth ineﬀective in providing the remedies they promised89, or both.
In 1902, the Biologics Act was passed after diphtheria antitoxin infected with tetanus was administered to
children in St. Louis, thirteen of whom later died.90 The Act required the licensing of drugs in interstate
commerce and their purveyors, and required licensed manufacturers of drugs to develop and adhere to proce-
dures intended to ensure safe and pure drug products.91 The FDA still enforces this law today by regulating
biological products such as vaccines, human blood products, and drugs produced through biotechnology.92
Then, in 1906, the Federal Food and Drug Act was passed. This law forbade the sale in interstate commerce
87Id. at 7 & 378.
88Id. at 8.
89Id. at 379.
90Id. at 8; Philip D. Noguchi, “From Jim to Gene and Beyond: An Odyssey of Biologics Regulation,” 51 Food and Drug
Law Journal 367, 367-70 (1996).
91Hutt & Merrill, supra note 85, at 8; Noguchi, supra note 90, at 370.
92Hutt & Merrill, supra note 85, at 14.
21of drugs that were either adulterated or marketed with fraudulent claims.93 Violations of the Act carried
criminal penalties, and the government was empowered to seize the drugs in question.94 Standards for purity
and quality of certain drugs were set forth in the United States Pharmacopoeia and the National Formu-
lary; manufacturers had to either conform to these standards or label their products otherwise.95 Imitation
and narcotic drugs were subjected to more stringent labeling requirements with the goal of ensuring safety,
eﬃcacy, and truthfulness in advertising.96 The FDA was created to handle the administrative burden of
regulation, inspection, and enforcement that was created by the 1906 Act.
In 1938, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (the FD&C Act) was passed to update the 1906 law and address
some of the problems the original Act had neglected.97 Most notably for the sake of this Paper, medical
devices were brought under the oversight of the FDA under the new law.98 This was due to growing concerns
about the marketing of fraudulent devices.99 Other additions to the law included the prohibition against
false advertising of drugs and the requirement of informative labeling on drugs, with improved controls to
ensure compliance with these laws.100 Also, the 1938 Act provided that any drug that could be dangerous to
health as prescribed would be classiﬁed as adulterated.101 One of the reasons behind these other additions
to the law was a 1937 incident in which diethylene glycol (antifreeze) was used as an unlisted solvent in a
drug preparation. The deadly ingredient was added without any research whatsoever into it is safety. At
least 73 deaths resulted from the manufacturer’s carelessness.102
Since 1938, the FD&C Act has been amended multiple times, although the changes have been far smaller in
scope than those made in 1938. Generally, the amendments have extended the coverage of the FD&C Act or
93Id. at 9.
94Id.
95Id.
96Id. at 9-10.
97Id. at 11-13.
98Hutt & Merrill, supra note 85, at 12.
99Id.
100Id.
101Id.
102Id. at 476.
22enlarged the FDA’s authority over products already under its purview.103 The Drug Amendments of 1962
overhauled the method by which the FDA regulates new drugs104, and the Medical Device Amendments of
1976 changed the manner and scope of FDA regulation of devices.105 In 1990, the Safe Medical Devices Act
altered somewhat the 1976 regulatory structure with regard to devices.106
B. How Drugs and Devices Are Currently Regulated
1. Drugs
a. FDA Approval of New Drugs
The 1962 Drug Amendments created a system of premarket approval of every new drug, with the focus of
the inquiry being safety and eﬃcacy.107 A “new drug” is one that is not generally recognized as being safe
as it is proposed to be dosed, or alternatively, a drug generally considered safe but which has not been used
extensively enough for a long enough period of time for there to be adequate certainty of that fact.108 Before
a new drug can be marketed, a “new drug application” (NDA) must be approved by the FDA.109 In order
to be approved, the new drug must be shown by “substantial evidence” to be eﬀective and safe.110
The application process is both lengthy and costly. First, a manufacturer does research that identiﬁes
drugs which seem likely to be beneﬁcial to humans. This takes, on average, between 1-4 years.111 Next,
before submitting an NDA, the manufacturer must either have conducted testing on both animals and
103Id. at 13.
104See infra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of the current FDA regulatory scheme for drugs.
105Hutt & Merrill, supra note 85, at 13-14. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of the current FDA regulatory
scheme for devices.
106Id. at 746 n. 2.
107Id. at 13 & 475.
108Id. at 476.
109Id. at 478.
110Id.
111Hutt & Merrill, supra note 85, at 514.
23humans intended to demonstrate safety and eﬃcacy, or must have plans to do so.112 This research must also
identify the side eﬀects of the new drug, and may take between 4-6 years.113 The research and corporate
decisionmaking about research and development are typically not regulated directly by the FDA. However,
the types of research that the FDA requires before it will approve an NDA indirectly guides drug companies
in the kinds of research it undertakes with a new drug.114
Any study of a new, unapproved drug in human subjects must ﬁrst ﬁle a claim for an exemption for an
“investigational new drug” (IND) with the FDA. If the FDA does not respond within thirty days, the drug
company may begin human trials.115 When deciding whether or not to reject the claim of exemption, the
FDA is primarily concerned with protecting the research subjects, and secondarily interested in ensuring
appropriate scientiﬁc design of the studies.116 Human research is conducted in three phases, with the scope
of the research becoming broader as it progresses.117 Only one in ten drugs investigated at the IND stage
will be found worthy of an NDA ﬁling.118
Finally, the FDA will evaluate and (hopefully) approve the NDA. An NDA must contain all information,
both positive and negative, that has been found during the research into the drug’s safety and eﬃcacy, and
must disclose the manufacturing and quality assurance procedures.119 The FDA is required not to approve
an NDA unless the evidence provided demonstrates safety by all reasonable research methods.120 How the
FDA assesses safety has never been disclosed in regulations, but a former FDA Commissioner once stated
that there were three criteria considered: the potential beneﬁts conferred by the drug, the risk associated
112Id. at 513.
113Id. at 514.
114Id.
115Id. at 515.
116Id. Approval of the IRBs at the institution where the research is being conducted may also be required. Id.
117Hutt & Merrill, supra note 85, at 515-16.
118Id. at 516.
119Id. at 519.
120Id. at 522.
24with the drug’s use, and the relative weight of those beneﬁts and risks.121 The FDA is also required to
withhold approval of an NDA unless adequate scientiﬁc evidence demonstrates that the drug will be as
eﬀective as the manufacturer claims when used as recommended.122
The process of FDA review takes between 2-3 years.123 Studies have shown that the entire process, from
research to FDA approval, takes between 7 and 13 years and costs between $30-$50 million dollars.124 Some
NDAs receive expedited reviews if the drug in question is considered to one that will be a substantial and
important medical advance or if it is for the treatment of a potentially fatal or extremely severe illness.125
The FDA is not required to explain an approval of an NDA, although it has been FDA policy to do so.126
If the FDA decides to refuse approval of an NDA, the developer may request a hearing on the issue of the
drug’s approvability.127 It is rare that either approvals or denials of an NDA are challenged.128
After an NDA is approved, the sponsor must continue keep records and report to the FDA on the performance
of the drug. FDA regulations require that the manufacturer periodically submit information on safety and
eﬀectiveness of the drug, and also requires prompt notiﬁcation of any serious adverse reactions to the drug.129
Since 1962, some approvals of drugs have been revoked in the occasional instances in which the drugs caused
severe adverse reactions in some users that were only discoverable when the drugs were used in a very large
group of patients.130
b. Labeling Requirements
Under the FD&C Act, there are requirements and restrictions for the labeling of prescription drugs. Any
121Id.
122Id. at 525.
123Hutt & Merrill, supra note 85, at 514.
124Id. at 514 & 559.
125Id. at 529-31.
126Id. at 531-32.
127Id. at 520.
128Id. at 532.
129Hutt & Merrill, supra note 85, at 537.
130Id. at 544.
25drug with anything false or misleading on its label is “misbranded” and is thus a violation of the law.131
Furthermore, the label must contain adequate directions for use and adequate warnings against unsafe uses
of the drug.132 The warnings given and the claims made by a manufacturer about a new drug are submitted
to and approved by the FDA during the NDA process.133 The FDA may require a manufacturer to change,
include, or remove claims and warnings, or face denial of its NDA.134 The label must also include the name
and address of the manufacturer.135
The FDA also regulates claims made about drugs in advertising after marketing begins.136 Ads for drugs
must be truthful, fairly balanced, and not misleading about side eﬀects, contraindications, drug comparisons,
safety, eﬀectiveness, testimonial endorsements, approved or recommended uses, and the scope, relevance,
results, accuracy, and/or recency of knowledge and research about the product (among others).137 The FDA
does allow advertisement of a drug’s price, with certain restrictions.138
c. Limits on Physician Ability to Prescribe
Physicians occasionally wish to prescribe an FDA-approved drug for a use which is not approved. Often,
there is some (perhaps even compelling) evidence that a particular drug has therapeutic value in treating a
condition; however, at the time of FDA review and approval of the NDA, there was not suﬃcient evidence
that the drug was safe and eﬀective for that purpose.139 While the FDA does not permit a drug manufacturer
to promote the drug for the unapproved use, it does not consider a physician prescription of a drug for an
131Id. at 388.
132Id. at 422.
133Id. at 396 n. 6 & 422.
134Id.
135Hutt & Merrill, supra note 85, at 451.
136Id. at 454.
137Id. at 454-58.
138Id. at 465.
139See id. at 617. It is possible for a manufacturer to conduct further research and submit a supplemental NDA to the FDA
in order to receive approval for a new use of an already-approved drug. Id.
26unapproved use to be a violation of the FD&C Act.140
2. Devices
The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 created a new scheme for regulating medical devices from their de-
velopment through their marketing.141 These Amendments created a system of classiﬁcation for all medical
devices that corresponded with the FDA’s level of certainty about a particular device’s safety and eﬀective-
ness. All devices are subject to certain “general regulatory controls”, regardless of classiﬁcation.142
Class I devices require no premarket approval; regulatory controls are believed to be suﬃcient to guarantee
the safety and eﬃcacy of these devices.143 These devices typically pose very few health risks for the user.
Approximately 30 percent of all devices are rated Class I.144
For Class II devices, regulatory controls are not considered suﬃcient to guarantee safety and eﬃcacy. Thus,
FDA requires the development of a “performance standard” for the device, based upon data available. Class
II devices must comply with the FDA-established performance standard.145 Approximately 60 percent of
all devices are Class II.146
Class III devices are those for which regulatory controls are not enough to guarantee safety and eﬃcacy
and insuﬃcient data exists to determine a performance standard. Premarket approval is required for these
devices.147 Approximately 10 percent of all devices are in Class III.148
Notably, FDA has factored public opinion into its decisions with regard to the classiﬁcation of certain contro-
versial devices. For example, FDA originally planned to classify electroconvulsive therapy devices (used to
140Id. at 617.
141Hutt & Merrill, supra note 65, at 745.
142Id. at 746.
143Id. at 745.
144Id. at 750.
145Id. at 745.
146Id. at 750.
147Hutt & Merrill, supra note 85, at 745.
148Id. at 750.
27administer “shock treatments” to psychiatric patients) in Class II. However, when the public raised concerns
about the propriety of the use of this kind of treatment, the FDA decided to give the devices a Class III
rating.149
There are some devices for which there have been special rules created. For example, uses of cardiac pace-
makers must be registered. Devices must comply with these rules, in addition to the rules that apply to
their particular level of classiﬁcation.150
A device may thus only be marketed if it satisﬁes one of three requirements: one, the manufacturer submits
a premarket notiﬁcation (PMN) to the FDA that shows the device is “substantially equivalent” to a device
that was in use prior to the passage of the 1976 Amendments; two, it was subject to premarket approval
(PMA) by the FDA; or three, it was reclassiﬁed on petition to the FDA from Class III to Class II or I.151
a. Class III: Premarket Approval
Class III devices which are largely new innovations in medicine must pass a premarket approval by the
FDA.152 This requires the compilation of data on safety and eﬀectiveness of the device. In order to obtain
this data, the FDA allows the use of investigational new devices in clinical trials.153 If the use of the device
is considered to be a signiﬁcant risk to patients, the FDA requires an approval process analogous to the one
used for new drugs.154 Devices that are not considered signiﬁcant risks may merely obtain IRB approval
before clinical trials begin.155 Experimental devices may be used in emergency situations without prior
approval if it is the only possibility for saving the life of a patient who will die without immediate care.156
149Id. at 751.
150Id. at 746.
151Id. at 745.
152Id. at 756.
153Hutt & Merrill, supra note 85, at 756.
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28Once a manufacturer has gathered data on safety and eﬀectiveness, it applies to the FDA for approval of the
Class III device. The application is reviewed by an advisory committee, which gives an opinion on whether
the scientiﬁc evidence merits approval of the device.157 When deciding whether to approve a new device,
FDA weighs the probable health beneﬁts against the probable health risks in the use of the device. If the
beneﬁts outweigh the risks, the device is considered safe and eﬀective.158 After approval, the FDA may
occasionally require postmarketing studies of some kind.159
There is an alternative track for approval of a device. This is the product development protocol (PDP).
Under a PDP, the FDA and the device manufacturer develop a testing program together, and agree that if
the program is successful, the FDA will approve the device for marketing.160 However, this alternative has
only been used rarely.161
b. Class II: Performance Standards
Performance standards are set either by the FDA or voluntarily created by device manufacturers and are
intended to gauge the performance of devices which pose a moderate risk to the patients who use them.162
Compliance with these standards assures a minimum level of safety and eﬀectiveness without the greater
administrative burden of acquiring premarket approval.163
When creating the standards, the FDA considers the device’s uses and the potential health risks and beneﬁts
posed by those uses.164 Riskier Class II devices require mandatory performance standards. Manufacturers of
devices posing moderate risk may only be required to develop their own voluntary performance standards.165
157Id. at 762.
158Id. at 766 n.1.
159Hutt & Merrill, supra note 85, at 767 n.7.
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162Id. at 772-73.
163Id. at 773.
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29Some Class II devices are considered suﬃciently low-risk that they are subject only to special controls. These
controls may include postmarket observation, patient registries, guidelines, recommendations, and others.166
c. All Devices: General Regulatory Controls
These controls apply to medical devices of all types. Certain provisions require clear, truthful labeling and
prohibit adulteration and misbranding.167 The FDA has also set good manufacturing practice regulations
for devices, based on the risks to health from the use and possible failure of a particular device.168 There
are notiﬁcation, repair, refund, and replacement requirements that apply to medical devices that pose an
unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the user.169 The FDA may ban certain devices, primarily with the
goal of quashing “quack” devices.170 The FDA requires that some devices be available only by prescription.171
And ﬁnally, the FDA may require that a device manufacturer keep records about the devices and submit
that information in reports to the FDA.172
3. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Drug
and Device Regulatory Systems
The requirements for premarket review and approval of drugs and devices, leads the FDA to be signiﬁcantly
involved in the decisionmaking of the private manufacturers of new drugs, and the result of this extensive
and intrusive regulation is that the time and money invested in bringing a new drug to market is signiﬁcantly
166Id. at 777.
167Id. at 746, 778-85.
168Id. at 785-86.
169Id. at 788-89.
170Id. at 788.
171Hutt & Merrill, supra note 85, at 786-87.
172Id. at 787-88.
30increased.173 This has troubling consequences.
First, it slows the rate at which new drugs and devices are developed and brought into therapeutic use.
This is particularly important not just because of the impact on the biomedical subsector of the economy.
People in the United States who are suﬀering from diseases and disorders for which adequate treatments are
not currently available are personally injured if the regulations discourage drug and device manufacturers
from pursuing the innovations they would have made if not hindered by the overwhelming cost of the very
regulations that were instituted to protect the public. Even drugs and devices that manufacturers do choose
to develop are not made available to the public for many years, until they can pass FDA’s scrutiny. Tragically,
some of the most serious diseases are those for which there are currently no eﬀective treatments whatsoever–
for example, Lou Gehrig’s, Huntington’s, and Alzheimer’s diseases. If the regulatory apparatus has slowed
even somewhat the development and availability of treatments or cures for medical problems which cause
death and/or great suﬀering, it would be a strong argument against the current heavy regulation of drugs
and devices.
However, measures can and have been taken to lessen the negative impact of the regulation of drugs and
devices on innovation. Where critically ill patients will suﬀer serious health problems or death if they wait
for a drug or device to be approved for use in treatment, there are opportunities for them to gain access to
experimental treatments. For example, there are emergency use provisions for devices, which allow doctors
to use an unapproved device to treat a patient who would otherwise die.174
Laws have also been passed to lessen the ﬁnancial burden on innovation in drugs and devices. For example,
173Id. at 475.
174Id. at 759-60. See supra note 156.
31the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 provides incentives for manufacturers to invest in the development of drugs to
treat rare diseases (deﬁned as a condition aﬀecting fewer than 200,000 Americans), for projected sales of such
drugs are typically so low that manufacturers would not otherwise invest in the research, development, and
administrative processes required to bring them to market.175 These include tax and marketing incentives.176
The FD&C Act further requires the FDA to encourage orphan drug sponsors to allow people suﬀering from
the disease the drug is intended to treat access to the drug during clinical trials.177 These laws combat the
reduced incentive for innovation on the part of drug and device manufacturers in the face of the regulatory
burdens imposed by legislation.
Another concern raised by opponents of regulation is that the FDA regulatory scheme limits consumer
freedom of choice in their medical treatment. The FDA’s goal is to ensure that drugs and devices are safe,
eﬀective, and marketed in a truthful manner. Some consumers, however, would argue that they require only
accurate information about a product, and not premarket approval. Given adequate data, some consumers
would prefer to make their own decisions as to whether a drug or device is one they would like to make use
of in their medical treatment. The most compelling version of this argument is found in the cases of patients
who are terminally ill, in extreme pain or discomfort, or who have had their activity narrowly limited by a
condition. These people may arguably have much to gain and little to lose from gaining access to treatments
which have not been subject to FDA review and approval.
There are answers to this concern as well. First, as stated above, seriously or terminally ill patients may have
access to drugs that have not yet completed the FDA’s NDA approval process. This lessens the burden of
regulation on people with critical health problems. However, it is true that some freedom of choice remains
175Id. at 566.
176Id.
177Hutt & Merrill, supra note 85, at 518 n.8.
32restricted by the regulations. Yet, the trade-oﬀ made in the area of freedom of choice is justiﬁed by the
overwhelming beneﬁts of regulation. Very real, serious dangers are posed to the public at large by the
unregulated manufacture and sale of drugs and devices. The result of deregulation would be the potentially
widespread use of drugs and devices, intended to be therapeutic, which would in fact pose harms to health.
These harms might be the result of intentional recklessness and/or fraud on the part of manufacturers. More
often, perhaps, risks would arise because, due to economic pressures, manufacturers would not invest nearly
as much time or eﬀort in determining the safety and eﬀectiveness of a drug or device before bringing it to
market.
It is also important to note that “freedom of choice” would be an illusion for many patients in a world without
regulation of drugs and devices. The quality of drugs and devices would likely be closely correlated with
their cost. Many Americans would likely be unable to aﬀord high-quality treatments under such a regime.
Insurance companies might refuse to foot the bill for a safer device where a less expensive but slightly riskier
alternative is on the market. And children, who have no voice whatsoever in determining their own medical
care, would ﬁnd the quality of their health care at the mercy of their parents’s budget constraints.
It is also important to note that “freedom of choice” can exist only in a regime that retains some type of
labeling or disclosure requirement for drugs and devices. Without the information about safety, eﬃcacy,
side eﬀects, and intended uses that is gathered during the regulatory process and then disclosed to patients,
consumers would not have access to the information necessary to make informed decisions about their medical
care. And it is likely that, even if labeling and disclosure requirements were retained, manufacturers of drugs
and devices would not do nearly as much research on their products as they do under the requirements of the
current regulatory scheme, thus reducing the ability of any consumer to know what exactly their treatment
options entailed.
C. The Analogy Between Drugs, Devices, and Procedures
33The very same policy arguments which tip the balance in favor of federal regulation of drugs and devices
also martial in favor of FDA regulation of medical procedures. Many would undoubtedly argue that doctors
are the ones who perform procedures, and that they are capable of regulating themselves as to whether or
not a procedure is safe, eﬀective, and indicated in a particular situation. However, it is also possible to make
the identical argument about therapeutic drugs and devices. This parallel begs the question–why, then,
are drugs and devices regulated by the FDA while procedures are not? Are there logical reasons for the
diﬀerence?
In fact, it appears that the dichotomy is explained largely by the vagaries of legislative and administrative
history. As discussed above, the laws which culminated in the creation of the FDA were passed in response
to national crises over the safety and eﬃcacy of drugs on the market (usually vaccinations).178 Fraud
was common, and lawmakers undoubtedly reasoned that where fraud could cause serious harms to health,
consumer protection and government regulation were warranted.179 Later, the same concerns developed with
regard to medical devices, and when the food and drug laws were revamped in 1938, devices were included
as subject to regulation.180
No crisis of similar proportions has ever come to such prominence as to cause the U.S. Congress to enact
similar legislation with regard to medical procedures. However, this should not be interpreted to mean
that one has not occurred, or that there is no potential for one to occur. In fact, consumer fraud with
regard to medical procedures would be much easier to perpetrate without detection, for a host of reasons.
First, procedures are not often marketed in the manner that drugs and devices often are. It is rare to see
a television advertisement touting the wonderful beneﬁts of a medical procedure. Drugs and devices are
178See supra Part III.A.
179Id.
180See supra Part III.B.
34frequently marketed directly to consumers through print and broadcast media; ads for contact lenses, allergy
medications, hearing aids, birth control pills, motorized wheelchairs, and antidepressants, among others, are
seen daily by most American consumers. The medical procedures which are marketed directly to consumers,
such as corrective laser eye surgery and breast augmentation, typically have similar features: they tend to
be elective, cosmetic, and/or prominently feature the use of a regulated medical device.181
The vast majority of medical procedures, however, are unglamorous, and the consumer’s experience with
them, from the introduction of the idea through the procedure and aftercare, is controlled entirely by
doctors. In fact, a typical patient experience is probably to be seen by one doctor, or a few doctors working
in conjunction, either in the same practice, hospital, or referral system. Their practice is guided only by the
regulatory mechanism discussed.182 Practice guidelines may mandate disclosure of all the options available to
a patient, but there is little enforcement of them, and the myriad possible presentations of these options still
allows a physician a great deal of latitude in shaping the information given. Furthermore, in the treatment
setting, a patient typically has places a great deal of trust in the doctor’s professional opinion.
This situation gives the physician a great deal of power to manipulate the information a patient receives, and
thus their choices, with regard to medical procedures. While there are some incentives for physicians to do
their best in patient care–the tort of medical malpractice, professional and personal ethics, and the oversight
of institutions and professional organizations–there are just as many strong incentives for physicians to act
in their own self-interest when recommending the use of a medical procedure.
First and foremost are the motives of proﬁt and career advancement. Fame and fortune inure to the doctors
who are on the cutting edge of biomedical technology; see the name recognition Dr. Ian Wilmut, the re-
searcher who ﬁrst cloned a sheep, now enjoys.183 And the incentive to put money before patient care extends
181The previous assertions are based upon the author’s observations.
182See supra Part II.A.
183See, e.g., “A Clone in Sheep’s Clothing”, at http://www.sciam.com/explorations/030397clone/030397beards.html (last
35to more mundane procedures as well. Allegations that surgeons perform unnecessary surgical procedures,
such as hysterectomies, caesarian sections, and cardiac bypasses, instead of managing health conditions
through other medical means because surgeries are more proﬁtable are not uncommon.184 Physician self-
regulation is particularly ineﬀective at preventing this kind of misconduct by doctors because colleagues are
loath to question one another’s professional judgment. Also, doctors who work together, and who are thus in
the best position to question the judgment calls of their partners in practice, may have developed a culture
which elevates proﬁt over patient care in this manner.
Furthermore, where there existed several possible options for treatment of a condition, a procedure may cure
or improve the condition even though it is not the best treatment option.185 This makes it very diﬃcult
for a patient to learn that his treatment has been mismanaged by the doctor. The only way to discover
such an insidious form of malpractice is to compare the statistics for the whole of a doctor’s practice. If
the rates of a doctor’s use of invasive, expensive, and/or complicated procedures are higher than average,
malpractice may be indicated. However, this is only one possible interpretation of such facts; there may
be other rational explanations for why a particular doctor performs more of these procedures than others.
And the opportunity to conduct further investigations into a suspect doctor’s diagnoses is practically non-
existent. Doctor/patient conﬁdentiality and the lack of enforcement power in physician self-regulation makes
it unlikely that there will ever be any remedial action. Individual patients may seek a remedy via a medical
malpractice lawsuit, but again, the likelihood of a successful suit is low. This is because a patient may not
visited May 16, 2002).
184See generally “Needless Surgery”, at http://www.quackwatch.com/04ConsumerEducation/crhsurgery.html (last visited
May 16, 2002).
185See, e.g., Id.; “New Book Exposes Problem of Unnecessary OB-GYN Procedures,” at
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36even be aware that her case was managed improperly, and even if she does show that another doctor has
a diﬀerent opinion of how her case should have been handled, a jury may ﬁnd that this is simply a case of
inconsistent professional judgment not worthy of a ﬁnding of malpractice.
Deﬁning the term “procedure” for the sake of new regulations will be diﬃcult. What things that doctors
do should be considered a “procedure” with regard to the proposed regulations? While this Paper does not
attempt to classify every action a doctor might perform as a “medical procedure” or not for the sake of new
regulations, there are a few key characteristics which should be considered when deﬁning the term. First,
any medical treatment on a person which requires surgery or other intrusive measures on the body should
be subject to the new regulations. Second, any treatment which is likely to signiﬁcantly impact a patient’s
health status, either in the short- or long-term, should be considered a procedure. Third, any treatment
which might have signiﬁcant short- or long-term eﬀects on the patient’s lifestyle or major life activities should
be subject to the new regulations. For example, a non-surgical vasectomy would be a “procedure” because
it aﬀects the major life activity of reproduction. Not covered under such regulations would be such low-risk,
non-invasive, routine medical procedures as the use of diagnostic ultrasounds. While there may be other
factors that should be included, a deﬁnition primarily based on these three characteristics would bring most
of the medical interventions of concern under the authority of the new regulations on procedures.
IV. A COMPREHENSIVE REGULATORY SCHEME FOR ART
Clearly, a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme for the regulation of ARTs is necessary. But the regulation
of ARTs is merely one issue that must be addressed in the broader subject of reproduction’s intersection
with the law. Therefore, the following plan has two goals: ﬁrst, the regulation of ARTs on the federal level,
but also the formation of a standing body whose mission would be to gather information and recommend
cogent policies with regard to reproductive legal issues.
First, a National Commission on Life and the Law should be created in the image of the Canadian National
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medical procedures under a structure similar to that currently used to regulate drugs and devices.
A. Guiding a Federal Policy on ART: a National Commission
on Life and the Law
The ﬁrst step in formulating a national policy for the regulation of ARTs is to create a National Commis-
sion on Life and the Law, similar to that used in Canada and New York State. Like the New York State
Commission, its mandate would be broad: to gather information from all pertinent disciplines, to process
this information, to contemplate the ramiﬁcations of their conclusions, and to issue reports stating what the
Commission believes should be the policy of the United States with regard to particular issues regarding the
intersection of medicine and science, human life, and the law. These recommendations would include not only
proposed legislation, but also regulatory and educational measures, among others. The regulation of ARTs
would be only one of many issues this Commission would address, although because of the rapidly-changing
nature of the ART ﬁeld, I recommend that it be one of the ﬁrst problems the Commission addresses.
The Commission would be staﬀed by experts from multiple disciplines: lawyers, doctors, scientists, bioethi-
cists, sociologists, philosophers, social psychologists, and statisticians, among others. Approximately ten
Commissioners would sit at any one time; the disciplines represented would be ﬁxed but Commissioners
would be either reappointed or replaced by the President on a staggered schedule. Commissioners would
serve a term of ﬁve years. This schedule would help to ensure that the Commission maintains political
balance and is not easily swayed by partisan tides.
As in the New York State and Canadian models, the Commission would not only gather information about
a particular issue of life and the law from experts and scholarly research, but also from American citizens
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of the Commission for several reasons, both practical and idealistic. The average American does not hold
graduate degrees as the Commission experts would; in fact, only 25% of Americans are estimated to have
college degrees. The Commission would not be representative of the American public without some concerted
eﬀort to derive the opinion at large. This is not only important in the abstract; it is likely necessary for the
Commission to make such eﬀorts in order for its recommendations to have the appearance of legitimacy in
the eyes of the American voters. If voting Americans do not hold the Commission in respect, it is unlikely
that Congress will implement its recommendations. Indeed, the Commission will almost certainly need very
favorable public opinion behind it in order to convince members of Congress that it is not too politically
risky to try to legislate in an area so rife with powerful opinions and discordant beliefs.
In order to obtain this public opinion, the Commission should once more follow the Canadian and New
York State examples. Like Canada, the American Commission should maintain a toll-free hotline number
to gather public opinion. Telephone polls and mail-in surveys should be used toward this end as well. As
in New York State, telephone interviews should be conducted, not only with people who have had intimate
personal contact with the particular issue under consideration, but also with randomly selected people who
have no particular personal experience with the topic. Multiple sources of information will ensure a more
accurate picture of American public opinion as a whole.
The Commission should report its ﬁndings and recommendations in published form both to Congress, perti-
nent governmental bodies and non-governmental organizations, and the American public. Included in these
ﬁndings should be a detailed explanation of the deliberations and criteria that the Commission used when
making its decisions. While this should be done as quickly as possible, it is likely to take years, not months,
for the Commission to consider these weighty issues and render their judgments. As time passes and the
particular problems of the American Commission become evident through practice, perhaps it will be advis-
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of full Commissions serving, or the number of Commissioners.
The National Commission would be independent of other executive departments and agencies. The funds
required to operate the National Commission would likely be relatively insubstantial when compared to the
other items in the national budget.
B. FDA Regulation of Medical Procedures
While one is hopeful that Congress would implement the recommendations of the National Commission with
all due speed, that alone would not be a suﬃcient solution to the problem of the need to regulate ARTs more
stringently. In fact, all medical procedures are in need of closer scrutiny and should be regulated under the
auspices of the FDA in a manner similar to that used for drugs and devices. Heightened scrutiny should be
applied to procedures that, like ARTs, are particularly controversial.
1. Premarket Notiﬁcation/Approval Scheme
Medical procedures should be regulated on a tiered system like that used for medical devices. Like medical
devices, procedures would be categorized according to the amount of risk they posed to the patient, the
current level of knowledge about safety and eﬃcacy, and any other pertinent factors. “Other pertinent
factors” should include larger societal issues surrounding the use of a particular procedure, as has been done
with regard to the classiﬁcation of medical devices (see the example of electroconvulsive therapy devices).
Procedures that are relatively low risk and which have a track record of proven safety and eﬃcacy might
be considered Class I procedures. As with devices, general regulatory controls would be implemented to
monitor their use. These controls would include truth in labeling and advertising rules, general and speciﬁc
good practice standards for the performance of all medical procedures, training requirements for practitioners
performing certain procedures, maintenance of detailed records of patients undergoing particular procedures,
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Class II procedures would be those procedures which pose less than serious risks for patients undergoing them,
but for which there is not suﬃcient accurate data indicating safety and eﬀectiveness. As with Class II devices,
these procedures would be subject to regulatory measures above and beyond the general regulatory controls.
These measures would include the development of and adherence to mandatory performance standards for a
procedure, postmarket observation of the use and outcomes of a procedure, detailed patient registries, and
special guidelines and/or recommendations for the use of a procedure, among others.
Class III procedures would be those procedures which are inherently high-risk for the patient, inherently
high-risk for the practitioners, have an unproven track record for safety and eﬃcacy, and/or uses which pose
signiﬁcant social concerns.186 Some examples of Class III procedures would be heart transplants, surgery
on HIV-positive patients, surgery on HIV-positive patients, experimental procedures, and the use of ARTs.
These procedures would require the approval of the FDA before they could be performed on patients, with
exceptions provided for life-threatening emergency and experimental use, as seen in the drug and device
regulations. Class III procedures might also be required to adhere to a variety of special, procedure-speciﬁc
measures of the sort applied to Class II devices.
As with medical devices, procedures used prior to the implementation of the new regulations would be
grandfathered into the new regulatory program. While they would be classiﬁed and required to adhere to all
the general regulatory controls applicable to medical procedures, not even Class III procedures would have
186It should be noted that including ‘‘uses which pose significant social concerns’’ opens the door for the
classification of abortion as a Class III procedure. It might therefore be desirable to add a provision
stating that certain routine, long-standing abortion procedures may not be placed in the Class III category
on the ground of societal concern. This Paper offers no opinion as to the wisdom of such a provision as it is
outside the scope.
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would apply regardless of classiﬁcation. First, there would be speciﬁc statutory provisions for the review
of certain “procedures of concern” in use prior to the passage of the new regulations. All ARTs would be
subject to this type of review.187 Second, the FDA would be granted the power to decide of its own accord
to require review of a particular procedure of its own accord.
Finally, under the new regulatory scheme, the FDA would allow some procedures to avoid premarket approval
with a notiﬁcation to the agency stating that the procedure was substantially similar to a pre-regulatory
procedure. There would again be two exceptions. First, speciﬁc statutes would prohibit this for particular
classes of procedures, ART procedures being among them. Second, the FDA would also have the power to
require a review of the procedure at its discretion.
The premarket approval scheme for procedures would have serious drawbacks that are not a concern with
regard to drugs and devices. First, doctors may develop new procedures as they work, by incrementally
changing the way they perform over time. What changes would be considered “new procedures” for the sake
of regulation? Second, new procedures may be developed in a manner wholly diﬀerent from that of drugs
and devices; in fact, many of these discoveries may happen by accident in the course of treating patients. On
whom does the burden fall to sponsor a new Class III procedure for FDA approval? Individual doctors, and
quite probably hospitals, do not always have the resources to perform the type of preapplication research
required by the FDA for drugs and devices. Who should pay for the research necessary to assure safety and
eﬃcacy?
187Until the passage of new legislation after the opinion of the National Commission on ARTs is issued,
however, it is unlikely that procedures in wide usage, such as AID, AIH, IVF, and GIFT, would be banned
under such a regulatory reconsideration. It would, however, allow the FDA to require certain guidelines and
performance standards for these procedures, particularly with regard to the dosages of fertility drugs used,
the number of embryos implanted during one treatment cycle, and other issues of direct concern to patient
health.
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currently exist. This research will need to be done before legislators draft and pass the statutes that would
authorize the FDA to regulate procedures. As a result, this Paper can oﬀer only tentative answers. Probably
the deﬁnition of a “new procedure” would include signiﬁcant alterations to old procedures and entirely new
procedures. “Signiﬁcant alterations” would consist of changes that add high or unknown risks for the patient
and/or personnel, and/or that pose greater societal concerns. And, to deal with the special nature of the
development of procedures (often in the ﬁeld instead of in the lab) and the problems of funding as compared
to drug and device development, the regulation of medical procedures will likely permit greater experimental
use of procedures and lessen the burden of proof prior to approval of a procedure, while heightening general
regulatory controls, special controls, and postapproval surveillance. Reconsideration of procedures after their
use will likely be frequent.
The FDA’s new mandate to regulate medical procedures will be an extremely costly one. One can estimate
only on the basis of what is currently spent to regulate food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. The budget
necessary to fund the FDA would be signiﬁcantly increased by the addition of medical procedures to its
regulatory duties. Perhaps novel funding sources exist; however, the most likely source will be higher federal
taxes. This is unfortunate but necessary. The regulation of medical procedures is justiﬁed by the same
logic that supports the current regulation of drugs and devices. Therefore, it logically follows that funding
concerns alone ought not to overrule the need to improve the health care Americans enjoy in this area. If
Americans are willing to pay for this level of safety with regard to drugs and devices, it seems at least likely
that they would be willing to pay for safety protections with regard to medical procedures.
2. Requiring Speciﬁc Disclosures of Information
to Patients
43Disclosure requirements similar to those provided in the 1992 Fertility Clinic Disclosure Act should be
applied to all medical procedures. Doctors should be required to provide patients with disclosure forms
which provide detailed information about the procedure. These should include a very particular description
of the procedure itself, possible side eﬀects, typical national success rates, typical success rates for the doctor
performing the procedure, the major alternative treatments and their relative success rates, as well as the
training of the practitioner performing the procedure. For surgical patients, also included in the disclosure
should be at least an estimate of the doctor’s rate of reliance on surgery as opposed to medical management
of the disorder in question, as compared to a national, regional, or specialty average. The length of the
disclosure should be keyed to the classiﬁcation of the procedure. Class I procedures probably require only a
short disclosure; Class III procedures a lengthy one. Length will largely be dictated by the complexity and
riskiness of a procedure; however, Class III procedures should have more rigorous disclosure requirements
than do Class I and II procedures.
Doctors should be required to review the form with the patients, to give the patient adequate time in which to
review the form, and to provide answers to patient questions about the information in as straightforward and
clear a manner possible. Patients should then be required to sign the form prior to the procedure. Exceptions
would apply for emergency procedures in which it is not practically possible to have a full patient disclosure
session.
V. CONCLUSION
The use of ARTs in America today creates serious concerns not only for the health of the patients under-
going the procedures and the resulting oﬀspring, but also innumerable legal, bioethical, psychological, and
sociological quandaries as well. The problems resulting from the use of ARTs are in unique in many ways,
44but are also a remarkable example of a more widespread problem: the relative lack of regulation of medical
procedures. The United States should undertake to create a regulatory regime that would not only seek to
solve the problems of ARTs in particular but which would also address the regulation of all medical proce-
dures. Only when the federal government has formulated a cohesive policy with regard to ARTs and created
a regulatory apparatus within the FDA to aid in enforcement of that policy will these serious concerns be
signiﬁcantly alleviated.
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